Chapter 3
Syncretisms involving clusivity

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The inclusive and exclusive are commonly considered to be kinds of the first person plural. In this chapter, I will investigate whether they deserve this name by looking at syncretisms between clusivity and other person markers. Such syncretisms are rare, but a thorough investigation has resulted in a large enough sample to allow for some conclusions. The result is that the exclusive is often syncretic with the first person singular, and can thus indeed be considered a kind of first person plural. In contrast, the inclusive cannot. Further, the often claimed link between inclusive and second person in spurious. This claim probably only arose because of selected attention for those syncretisms arguing for such a connection, but disregarding all other syncretisms that argue against it. In this survey, all possible syncretisms are considered resulting in the observation that the inclusive/second person syncretism does not occur more often than others.

Keywords: syncretism, second person, third person, minimal/augmented, clusivity

1. Introduction

The commonly used name for the inclusive is ‘inclusive first person plural’ and for the exclusive ‘exclusive first person plural’. Such long names are not only cumbersome, but it is also questionable whether they describe the correct approach to the linguistic categories in question. It is not at all clear whether inclusives and exclusives are a kind of first person. Semantically, an inclusive refers to both first and second person, so it could just as well be analysed as a kind of second person. An exclusive refers to both first and third person and could thus just as well be considered a third person.

It is regularly claimed in the literature, in particular with reference to Algonquian languages, that some languages consider the inclusive to be a kind of second person (e.g. Zwicky 1977: 720–3; Plank 1985: 141–3; Hewson 1991: 862–5; Noyer 1992: 155–7). Such languages are then contrasted to the widespread structure showing a pronoun we, in which inclusive reference is part of first person (because the meaning of English we can be interpreted as being both inclusive and exclusive). In this argumentation, there are two possibilities for human language: either a speaker-centered perspective (as in English) or an addressee-centered perspective (as in Algonquian). In this chapter, I will present a typological argument showing that this opposition is misled. It is well-known that the English-type we pronoun
is extremely common among the world’s languages. In contrast, I will show that the Algonquian-type inclusive/second person combination is extremely rare. If this rarity is considered of central importance for our theory of language, than other rarities should also be taken into account. For example, it turns out that inclusive/third person combinations are just as common as the Algonquian type inclusive/second person combination.

In this article, I will present a large collection of examples in which the inclusive or the exclusive is exactly alike to another person marker in the same paradigm. If a particular language uses the same morpheme for various apparently unrelated functions or meanings, it is possible that the various meanings have accidentally merged. Or they have a common origin, but the synchronic usages are too different to warrant a unified analysis. In any case, the proper null-hypothesis should be that formally homophonous morphemes in a language have a unified meaning — until reasons are found that prove this hypothesis wrong. This order of examination is crucial for the empirical basis of linguistic analysis. Two meanings might look different from our current understanding of linguistic structure, yet this understanding could be wrong — or short-sighted. Apparently accidentally homophonous morphemes in any language can be used to empirically test our understanding of linguistic structure. If two meanings turn out to be homophonous in language after language, then this is an argument to reconsider the original analysis.

From the present collection, it turns out that the exclusive is regularly homophonous with the first person singular. In contrast, the inclusive is hardly found to be homophonous with the first person singular. So there appears to be some correspondence between the first person and the exclusive, but not between the first person and the inclusive. Further, there are example in which the inclusive is homophonous with the second person and examples in which the exclusive is homophonous with the third person — both options that appear to make sense semantically. However, these semantically transparent syncretisms are just as frequently attested as the contrasting opaque syncretisms, viz. inclusive with third person and exclusive with second person. There is thus no reason to assume a special connection between any of these categories. Specifically, the inclusive does not have a special relationship to the second person.

This article will be outlined as follows. In Section 2, I will discuss some methodological consideration. The Sections 3 to 6 are the heart of the present article. In each of these sections, a long list of cases with a particular syncretism involving clusivity is presented and discussed. Section 3 discusses syncretisms between clusivity and first person. Section 4 discusses syncretisms between clusivity and second person. Section 5 discusses syncretisms between clusivity and third person. All theoretically possible syncretisms are attested, though only the one between exclusive and first person seems to be frequent enough to be typologically worth of further considerations. Finally, Section 6 discusses some special syncretisms between inclusive and exclusive. The characteristics of all these cases are summarised and analysed in Section 7. I will argue there that there is typologically no reason to give the syn-
cretism between the inclusive and the second person a special status. This particular syncretism might make sense semantically/cognitively as it puts the addressee at the centre of the person marking, yet this syncretism is just as rarely found as other syncretisms, which are semantically/cognitively intransparent. In Section 8, I will discuss some attempts from the literature to make sense of the various syncretisms. I will criticise the appeal to purportedly widespread (or even universal) linguistic characteristics to explain a highly exotic and probably just incidental syncretism. Explanations should be on the same level of generalisation as the phenomenon that they try to explain. Common phenomena need more sweeping generalisations, while incidental phenomena should be approached with a situation-specific explanation.

2. Methodological musings

This chapter consists of a collection of languages in which the morpheme that is used for inclusive or exclusive reference is also used for other person reference. The likeness between the marking of these different referential values should not be merely approximately, but the match has to be exact within the phonological structure of the language in question. The problem with approximate likeness is that it is notoriously difficult to handle. Should the number of phonemes that are different be counted, or maybe the number of phonemes that are identical, or both? Should the phonetic likeness of the differing morphemes be valued? Even if one would find a suitable quantification of approximate likeness, then it is still questionable whether this means anything. If two morphemes in a language differ in only one phoneme (e.g. English *me*, *we*, *he* and *she*), then they are of course closely alike, but the difference is still salient for the speakers of a language. To avoid this methodological muddle, I have decided to restrict my investigation to cases of exact likeness (like the English *you*-singular and *you*-plural).

The main body of this chapter will be a rather dry survey of languages that distinguish between an inclusive and an exclusive morpheme, yet either of those morphemes is exactly homophonous with another marker in the same person paradigm. Morphologically separatistic number markers are not considered as part of the person paradigm in this chapter. I include examples of syncretism from all available kinds of person marking, whether it are independent pronouns, inflectional or clitic person marking, or pronominal possession. I did not include examples in which the overlap of marking is found in an inflectional paradigm for only one verbclass (or nounclass). The homophony should minimally be present in all instantiations of a particular paradigm — though it can (and often will) not be found throughout all paradigms of person in the whole language.

Combination of categories in a paradigm can be called a structural ambiguity, a syncretism, or simply a homophony. I will use the term syncretism, which is intended as a neutral empirical cover-term for all observed cases (cf. Luraghi 2000).
Also, I do not distinguish languages in which this syncretism is a meaningful ambiguity, which reflects the conceptualisation of reality of a particular speech community, from those cases in which the syncretism is only an incidental result of phonological merger. Even when a syncretism is an incidental merger, then it is still part of the synchronic structure of a language, which is used by some human community of speakers. The simple, yet arduous task that I have set myself is to collect all cases that have such a syncretism and then to analyse these cases synchronically and diachronically. Two questions will be asked for every language that will be described in this chapter. First, is there any obligatorily way in which the syncretism is disambiguated? It turns out that in many cases there is no obligatory instrument in the language structure that disambiguates the possible meanings of the syncretism. Only in those cases in which there is obligatory marking to disambiguate the syncretism, this strategy will be explicitly noted in this chapter. If there is no obligatorily disambiguation, this will in most cases simply not be mentioned. The second question that will be asked for every language is whether the syncretism can readily be argued to be the result of a (recent) historical merger. If, for example, a phonological merger caused two erstwhile different morphemes to become identical, the resulting syncretism can readily be argued to be an incidental effect. A problem is that there are no historical data available for most languages that will be discussed in this chapter. To investigate the history of the syncretisms attested, I will draw either on close relatives (as in comparative reconstruction) or, incidentally, on language-internal (ir)regularities (as in internal reconstruction).

The present collection of cases is a result of rather ad hoc sampling. The problem with a consistent sampling strategy (cf. Rijkhoff and Bakker 1998) is that the kind of syncretisms that I am interested in is uncommon among the world’s languages. In a standard typological sample, these syncretisms would not even appear, or only as exceptions. This touches on a central problem with strict sampling procedures in typology. A sample can show which linguistic types are common among the world’s languages, but it cannot be used to analyse a type that is possible, yet uncommon. It is good practice to amend each large-scale typology with a detailed investigation of uncommon types. A fine example of this method is the chapter on gender/number marking by Plank and Schellinger (1997). This chapter starts with the well-known Greenbergian universals, which state that gender distinctions in the plural imply gender distinctions in the singular. However, the authors then show that, on closer inspection, a large set of ‘counterexamples’ exists. By collecting these ‘exceptional’ examples a deeper understanding of the possible variability of human language can be reached.

Likewise, for this chapter I started from a large-scale typological investigation of person marking (Cysouw 2003) in which syncretisms between clusivity and other person categories turned out to exist, yet to be uncommon. To further investigate the possible variability of human language, I amended the examples from that study with cases described in other publications and asked colleagues for any examples they happened to know of. Then I closely investigated the families and linguistic
areas in which these syncretisms were attested. Clusivity is known to be an areal phenomenon (Jacobsen 1980; Nichols 1992; Cysouw forthcoming), so investigating areas known to show clusivity is prone to turn up more examples. By cyclically questioning specialist and investigating specific linguistic areas and/or families, I was able to expand the collection to the present size. However, it should not be forgotten that, notwithstanding the rather large collection of cases that will be presented shortly, the occurrence of a syncretism between clusivity and other person categories is typologically uncommon.

3. Clusivity and first person

3.1. Introduction

Traditionally, inclusive and exclusive marking are seen as specifications of the first person plural. In this section, I will test this traditional approach empirically by searching for syncretisms between the inclusive and the first person singular (Section 3.2) and between exclusive and first person singular (Section 3.3). If inclusive and exclusive are indeed a kind of first person, then I expect to find languages that show a formal similarity between those categories. The most extreme form of similarity is complete identity, as surveyed in this chapter. Such complete identity does not occur frequently, but it is possible to find some examples among the wide variety of structures among the world’s languages. The result of this survey is that examples of inclusive/first person syncretisms are much rarer than examples of an exclusive/first person syncretism. This shows that the exclusive is indeed a kind of first person, but the inclusive is not (cf. Daniel, this volume).

3.2. Inclusive = first person

As far as I have been able to find, there is only one language that has a regular syncretism between an inclusive and the first person singular. In the so-called ‘Past II stative’ paradigm in Binandere, a Goilalan language from New Guinea, the suffixes for both first person singular and inclusive are -ana. In contrast, the exclusive suffix is -ara. All other tense/aspect paradigms show exactly the same syncretism (Capell 1969: 16–31). This syncretism is probably a relatively recent addition to the paradigm, as two close relatives, Orokaiva and Korafe, have exactly the same form of the suffixes, yet without an inclusive/exclusive opposition. The ‘indicative Mid Past B’ from Orokaiva has a first person singular -ana and a first person plural -ara (Healey et al. 1969: 62). The present indicative from Korafe has a first person singular -ena and a first person plural -era (Farr and Farr 1975: 747–9). The structure of Binandere is quite possibly the result of an extension of an original first person singular reference of -ana. However, the fact that Binandere is the only presently known example of a complete identity between inclusive and first person singular indicates
that the inclusive cannot systematically be regarded as a kind of first person. In contrast, the long list of examples of exclusive/first person syncretisms, to be presented next, shows that the exclusive is a kind of first person.

3.3. Exclusive = first person

A syncretism between exclusive and first person singular is particularly prominent among the world’s languages. There are a few clear areal clusters of this syncretism. It is found in a few restricted areas among native American languages and among the Papuan languages of New Guinea. Except for these two macro-areas, there are various incidental examples.

All examples of an exclusive/first person syncretism in North America are attested in prefixal person paradigms. In all these cases, the exclusive is disambiguated from the first person singular by a number affix. This pattern is found throughout the Central and Eastern branches of Algonquian, e.g. in Eastern Ojibwa (Bloomfield 1956: 44), Southwestern Ojibwe (Schwartz and Dunnigan 1986: 305), Menomini (Bloomfield 1962: 36–40), Cree (Wolfart 1996: 399–400) and Passamaquoddy-Maliseet (Leavitt 1996: 9–10). The exclusive/first person is marked by a prefix $n(i)$- in contrast to a prefix $k(i)$- for the inclusive (this inclusive is in turn identical to the second person, cf. Section 4.2). Another example of an exclusive/first person syncretism is found in Winnebago, a Siouan language. In Winnebago, the ‘agentive’ inclusive is marked by a prefix hi- while the first person and exclusive are both marked by a prefix ha-. This syncretism can be disambiguated by the use of a number suffix -wi.

In Mesoamerica, a few examples of an exclusive/first person syncretism are attested in independent pronouns. In the Mixtec languages, there is an ongoing development in which the exclusive independent pronoun (and the second person plural pronoun) is reinterpreted as an honorific pronoun, used for humble self-reference. This change can be inferred from the variation among the Mixtec languages. In some languages, there is a clear exclusive pronoun, apparently without honorific usage (e.g. Jamiltepec Mixtec, Johnson 1988: 114–16; Ayutla Mixtec, Hills 1990: 209–10). In some languages, this pronoun can be used for exclusive reference and for humble self-reference (e.g. Coatzospan Mixtec, Small 1990: 413–14; Silacayoapan Mixtec, Shields 1988: 406–7). Finally, there are a few languages, in
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which the formerly exclusive pronoun is solely used for humble self-reference and not for exclusive reference anymore (e.g. Chalcatongo Mixtec, Macaulay 1996: 138–43; Ocotepec Mixtec, Alexander 1988: 263–4; Yosondúa Mixtec, Farris 1992: 134–5; Díuxi-Tilantongo Mixtec, Kuiper and Oram 1991: 341). The inclusive pronoun is not affected by this change. In this last set of languages, the formerly first person singular pronoun is now used both for the exclusive and for the first person singular. This exclusive/first person syncretism in the independent pronouns can be disambiguated by other linguistic means, but that does not appear to be obligatory. For example, Macaulay (1996: 81) remarks on Chalcatongo Mixtec that: “ plurals … may be marked by addition of the prefix kà- to the verb stem when the subject is plural, and/or by various syntactic means.” An exclusive/first person syncretism is also found in Choco, a Popolocan language (Veerman-Leichsenring 2000: 325–7). Other Popolocan languages do not show this syncretism. The Popolocan languages are only distantly related to Mixtecan (both are part of Oto-Manguean), but the Choco language is spoken in the direct vicinity of the above mentioned Mixtecan languages with an exclusive/first person syncretism (in the western part of the Mexican state of Oaxaca). The syncretism in Choco is thus probably a result of language contact. Also in Mesoamerica, inflectional exclusive/first person syncretisms are found in Sierra Popoluca, a Mixe-Zoque language (Foster and Foster 1948: 17–19; Elson 1960: 207) and in Huave, a Huavean language (Stairs and Hollenbach 1969: 48–53; see also Section 5.2). In both languages, number suffixes disambiguate the exclusive from the first person singular.

In South America, the exclusive/first person syncretism is attested as an areal feature in central Peru. It is found in all Campan languages, a subgroup of the Arawakan family, both in the independent pronouns and in the verb inflection (e.g. Asheninca, Reed and Payne 1986: 324–7; Nomatsiguenga, Wise 1971: 647; Caquinte, Swift 1988: 61–2). The same syncretism, both in pronouns and inflection, is also attested in Jaquar (Hardman 1966: 79) and the closely related language Aymara (Hardman 2001: 103–19). Surrounded by Aymara-speaking population, the closely related language Uru and Chipaya have the same syncretism in their pronominal prefixes (Crevels & Muysken, this volume). A further example of this structure is the inflection from Tarma Quechua (Adelaar 1977: 89–93, 127–8). In Huallaga Quechua, a close relative of Tarma Quechua within subgroup I of the Quechuan languages, the exclusive is disambiguatated from the first person singular by the obligatory addition of the nominal plural marking –kuna. The areal distribution of these languages is striking. All are all spoken in close vicinity of each other in central Peru, extending eastwards into Bolivia. The pronominal systems of these languages are strongly alike: they are all ‘4-person’ systems, consisting of first, second, third person (without singular/plural distinction) and a separate inclusive. Within each of their genetic families, these languages are unique in having such a structure. Their similarity is thus clearly the result of areal influence. Also in South America, but outside this area in Peru, an exclusive/first person syncretism is also found in the independent pronouns and verbal inflection of Canela-Kraho, a Gê language from Brazil (Popjes
and Popjes 1986: 175) and in the inflection of Maká, Mataco-Guaicuruan language from Paraguay (Gerzenstein 1994: 83–97).

In New Guinea, the exclusive/first person syncretism is attested regularly among independent pronouns. In Nimboran (Anceaux 1965: 167) and in the Border languages Imonda (Seiler 1985: 44) and Amanab (Minch 1991: 31–2) the first person singular pronoun is also used with exclusive reference, but there is a different pronoun for inclusive reference. In Nimboran, the verb inflection has the same syncretism, although there are number affixes that disambiguate the exclusive from the first person singular (Anceaux 1965: 83–91). These languages are all spoken in an area around the border between Irian-Jaya and Papua New Guinea on the northern side of the Island.

More examples of the exclusive/first person syncretism are attested among the Tanna languages, a subgroup of Austronesian spoken in Vanuatu. The five Tanna languages, Kwamera, Lenakel, North Tanna, Southwest Tanna and Whitesands, all have the same prefix for first person and exclusive. Both meanings are regularly differentiated by number affixes (Lynch 1967; 1978: 45; Lindstrom and Lynch 1994: 10). Other languages closely related to Tanna do not have this syncretism (e.g. Ura, Crowley 1998: 21; see also Section 5.2).

An exclusive/first person syncretism is also found in Tiwi, a language spoken on a little island near Australia. The subject prefix in transitive constructions is ngi(mpi)- for first person singular and for exclusive reference (Osborne 1974: 38; Lee 1987: 173). In Warrwa, a Nyulnyulan language from mainland Australia, the actor prefix nga/ka- is used both for first person and exclusive, in contrast to a prefix ya- for inclusive (McGregor 1994: 41). This syncretism is a recent merger because in Bardi, a close relative of Warrwa, the forms for first person singular ya- and exclusive ay- are still differentiated (Metcalfe 1975: 123). In Nyulnyul, another close relative of Warrwa, the inclusive and exclusive marking has merged, using the formerly inclusive prefix ya- (McGregor 1996: 40–1; see also Section 6.3 below).

Finally, three geographically scattered cases with an exclusive/first person syncretism are the subject prefixes from Svan, a South Caucasian language (Tuite 1997: 23, disambiguated by number suffixes), the subject prefixes from Ngiti, a Nilo-Saharan language (Kutsch Lojenga 1994: 190–3, 220) and the independent pronouns from Chrau, a Mon-Khmer language. The first-person pronoun in Chrau “may be used as plural without modification . . . but plurality is often indicated by preposing kha or khay” (Thomas 1971: 138). In all these scattered cases, close relatives do not show an inclusive/first person syncretism.

3.4. Summary

There is a clear asymmetry between the two possible syncretisms reviewed in this section. Judging from the high amount of exclusive/first person syncretisms attested, the exclusive can indeed be seen as a special kind of first person. In contrast, the solitary example of an inclusive/first person syncretism indicates that the inclu-
4. Clusivity and second person

4.1. Introduction

In this section, examples of syncretisms between clusivity and second person are presented. First, in Section 4.2, the possibility of a syncretism between inclusive and second person is discussed. There are indeed such syncretisms, yet the number of examples is not overwhelming. In Section 4.3, some apparent cases of an inclusive/second person syncretism are dismissed, because the inclusive forms are combinations of first and second person marking. Finally, in Section 4.4, a survey is presented of syncretism between exclusive and second person. From a semantic point of view, the existence of such syncretisms is strange because exclusive and second person do not have any referential overlap. Still, such syncretisms exist and are about as frequent as inclusive/second person syncretisms.

4.2. Inclusive = second person

The notoriously recurring example in the literature of a syncretism between inclusive and second person is the Algonquian family (e.g. Zwicky 1977: 720–3; Plank 1985: 141–3; Hewson 1991: 862–5; Noyer 1992: 155–7). The crucial phenomenon in Algonquian is the occurrence of a person prefix ki- for both inclusive and second person. This is found throughout the Central and Eastern branches of Algonquian, e.g. in Eastern Ojibwa (Bloomfield 1956: 44), Southwestern Ojibwe (Schwartz and Dunnigan 1986: 305), Menomini (Bloomfield 1962: 36–40), Cree (Wolfart 1996: 399–400) and Passamaquoddy-Maliseet (Leavitt 1996: 9–10). The pronominal prefixes can be reconstructed for Proto-Algonquian (Bloomfield 1946: 97–9; Goddard 1990: 108) and probably the inclusive usage of ki- as well (Richard Rhodes, p.c.). In contrast, the syncretism is not attested in Blackfoot, where ki- is only used for second person and not for inclusive reference (Franitz 1991: 22). It is important to realise that this syncretism in Algonquian is always disambiguated by various number suffixes, also distinguishing some person categories (see the end of section 4.3 for a discussion of the implications of the existence of these suffixes).

Besides the Algonquian languages, it turns out to be rather difficult to find good examples of a syncretism between inclusive and second person. The following examples are all incidental cases within their linguistic family. A particularly fine case is the independent pronoun paradigm from Sanuma, a Yanomam language from Venezuela/Brazil. In Sanuma, the pronoun (ka)mašō is used for both inclusive as well as second person plural reference. The contrasting pronoun sanakō is used for exclusive reference (Borgman 1990: 149). There is no verbal inflection, nor any
other linguistic device that disambiguates this syncretism. Also in South America, though independent from Sanuma, an inclusive/second person syncretism is also attested in the independent pronouns and the verbal prefixes of Itonama, an isolate from Bolivia (Camp & Liccardi 1965: 332, 375; Crevels & Muyssen, this volume). A further example of this syncretism is found in Lavukaleve, an East Papuan language from the Solomon Islands. The pronominal prefix me- is used both for inclusive and second person plural (Terrill 2003: 242–4). This syncretism is probably the result of a recent merger. The closely related language Savosavo differentiates between an inclusive mani and a second person plural me (Todd 1975: 813). Fourth, the second person plural agent pronominal prefix -bà from Kiowa, a Tanoan language from North America, is also used to mark inclusive (Watkins 1984: 113). The closely related language Southern Tiwa does not mark clusivity (Allen and Frantz 1978: 11).

Fifth, the Kiranti (Tibeto-Burman) language Kulung has a dual suffix -ci, just as all other Kiranti languages. However, in Kulung, the inclusive and the second person dual are not marked by any other morphological device, leaving an inclusive/second person syncretism (Tolsma 1997: 107). Finally, the direct object prefixes from the non-Pama-Nyungan language Tiwi in Australia use a prefix mani- both for inclusive and second person plural (Osborne 1974: 39; Lee 1987: 180).

There are two more languages with a syncretism between inclusive and second person. In both these languages, the syncretism is attested in a phonologically reduced variant of the personal pronouns. The syncretism is not attested in the full forms, so the syncretism in the reduced forms can readily be interpreted as example of an ongoing merger. The first case is Diola-Fogny, an Atlantic (Niger-Congo) language from Senegal. In this language, verbs have prefixal bound pronouns. The short versions of these prefixes show a prefix u- for both inclusive and second person singular. However, the inclusive meaning is obligatorily disambiguated from the second person singular by a suffix -(e) (Sapir 1965: 90–1, see also Section 5.3). The second case of an inclusive/second person syncretism in reduced pronouns is attested in Acelhne, a Chamic language spoken in Northern Sumatra (Indonesia). The full forms of the independent pronoun clearly distinguish an inclusive (geu)tanyoe from a second person (informal) gata. However, the corresponding clitics are identical, either ta- as a prefix or -teu(h) as a suffix (Durie 1985: 117).

4.3. Dismissing other apparent inclusive/second person syncretisms

There are a few languages for which an inclusive/second person syncretism is claimed in the literature, but I will argue that these syncretisms are only superficial phenomena for two different reasons. First, there are a few languages that have a number marker, which happens to be found only in the inclusive and in the second person plural. This might look like an inclusive/second person syncretism, but the syncretism is not found in the person marking, but in the number marking. This is, for example, the case in Quechua. Mannheim (1982: 147) claims an inclusive/sec-
ond person syncretism for Quechua. There is indeed an identical suffix -cis both in the inclusive and in the second person in some of the Quechuan languages (cf. Pottier 1963; van de Kerke 1996: 120–5). However, this is neither a syncretism of the complete person markers (the inclusive suffix is -neis and the second person plural suffix is -nikcis), nor is it found in all Quechuan languages. Originally, the suffix -cis was used as an inclusive marker, which has been combined with the second person singular -n-ki to form the second person plural -n-ki-cis. The suffix -cis can probably be related historically to a particle indicating abundance (Cerrón Palomina 1987: 271). Another example of a number marker that is attested only in the inclusive and the second person is the suffix -Vmu from Muna, a Western Malayo-Polynesian language from Sulawesi (van den Berg 1989: 51, 53, 81). This is not counted as a syncretism here because the real person markers are prefixes, the suffix -Vmu being probably best analysed as a number suffix, which only happens to be used in the inclusive and the second person. The person prefixes will appear later on in Section 5.2, because these prefixes have a syncretism between inclusive and third person.

The second reason why some claims for an inclusive/second person syncretism from the literature are not included here is that the apparent syncretism is, on closer inspection, only part of the story. The problem is that inclusive marking in some language is a combination of first and second person marking. A clear example of such a combination is the inclusive pronoun yumi — made from the English pronouns you and me — as attested in Tok Pisin and some other English based Creoles in the Pacific (Mühlhäusler 1986: 161). This is of course no syncretism between inclusive and second person. It could just as well be called a syncretism between inclusive and first person. In fact, the inclusive meaning is established neatly componentially by combining first and second person morphology into one word.

There are numerous variants on this theme. A more detailed discussion of this phenomenon is presented under the heading ‘hybrid inclusives’ in section 8 of Daniel (this volume). He argues that there are different kinds of componentiality involved, an analysis which I subscribe. However, a finer-grained differentiation does not lessen the point that these inclusives use a combination of first and second person markers (however complicated the semantic details), and can thus just as well be considered a kind of first person as a kind of second person. They cannot be used to argue for a special link between inclusive and second person.

A nice illustration of a componential construction is the inclusive marking from Maybrat, a West Papuan language from Irian Jaya. To express the inclusive, the second person plural independent pronoun anu is used, so it might look like there is an inclusive/second person syncretism. Actually, the inclusive “is expressed by using the free pronoun anu followed by a verb that takes a first person plural person prefix p-” (Dol 1999: 70), as illustrated in (1). The inclusive is marked by a combination of second and first person marking, so there is no special connection between inclusive and second person.
This problem is of importance for the case of Khoekhoe (=Nama/Damara), a Khoe language from Namibia. In this language, it appears as if the so-called ‘pronominal root’ *saa shows a syncretism between inclusive and second person. I will argue that this is not the case (in contrast to an earlier claim in Cysouw 2001: 151). The central problem is that *saa only has the inclusive interpretation in combination with a first person clitic attached to it. In this combination, the inclusive meaning can be constructed componentially from the constituting parts ‘you’ + ‘we’, just as the Tok Pisin inclusive *yumi consists of the parts ‘you’ + ‘I’. The meaning of *saa is only ‘you’ and the apparent syncretism with the inclusive is a result of the combination with a first person clitic. I will present two arguments for this analysis of Khoekhoe, a synchronic and a diachronic one.

For the synchronic argument, it is important to understand the structure of Khoekhoe person marking. The main device for person marking in Khoekhoe is the pronominal clitic (called ‘person-gender-number marker’ (PGN) by Hagman 1977; but ‘nominal designant’ (Nd) by Haacke 1977). These clitics do not mark clusivity. The pronominal roots (among them *saa) only occur sparingly, and if they occur, they are almost always followed by a pronominal clitic. The only constructions in which the roots are not followed by a clitic is when marking pronominal possession, and then the only possible reference of *saa is second person singular (Hagman 1977: 36; Haacke 1977: 47–8). The only way to get inclusive reference is by a combination of second person *saa with a first person non-singular clitic (Hagman 1977: 43–4).

For the diachronic argument it is important to realise that Khoisan is not a genetic unit. At the present stage of knowledge, it consists at least of three families and a few isolates (Güldemann and Vossen 2000). As explained above, Khoekhoe is part of the Khoe family (formerly ‘Central Khoisan’). The pronominal clitics can be confidently reconstructed for proto-Khoe (Vossen 1997: 377). The reconstruction of the pronominal roots is less straightforward (Vossen 1997: 368). However, it is clear that clusivity is not part of the reconstructed pronominal roots in proto-Khoe — it is an innovation of Khoekhoe. Güldemann (2002: 51–3) argues that clusivity in Khoekhoe is borrowed from a language of the !Ui-Taa family (‘Southern Khoisan’). Following this proposal, the only pronominal roots to be reconstructed for proto-Khoe are *tii for first person and *saa for second person (Güldemann argues here against Vossen 1997: 368). Khoekhoe has borrowed the exclusive root *tii from !Ui-Taa, using its own second person root *saa together with the pronominal clitics to form the missing inclusive (as described above).

It turns out that real inclusive/second person syncretism is only attested in the Algonquian family and in a few incidental cases. However, the Algonquian case is
not beyond doubt. In the Algonquian languages, the inclusive/second person syncretism in the prefixes is obligatorily disambiguated by suffixes for all non-singular categories. These suffixes might be considered plural suffixes, as they only occur in the non-singular. However, they have different forms for first (-min), second (-m) and third person (-wak) plural. Taking the history of the Khoekhoe person marking as an guide, one might speculate that clusivity was not part of proto-Algic (just as it is not found in the other major northern American families Salish, Athabascan, and Eskimo-Aleut). Its history could have been as follows. First there were person suffixes without marking clusivity and later the person prefixes, also without clusivity, were innovated. The new inclusive category was made by combining the second person prefix with the first person suffix. The reason for this innovation might have been contact (e.g. with the Iroquoian languages, which all have a clear inclusive/exclusive opposition). In this interpretation, the Algonquian inclusive is a semantically transparent combination of first and second person markers, and I would not consider it a case of inclusive/second person syncretism. However, the comparative details of Algonquian person marking have to be investigated more closely to backup this speculation. Until a clear decision to the contrary, I will interpret the Algonquian prefixes as a case of an inclusive/second person syncretism.

To summarise, inclusive/second person syncretisms exist among the world’s languages but the number of examples is not overwhelming. The question now remains how frequent other theoretically possible syncretisms involving clusivity are. As I will show below, the other possibilities are at least as common as the inclusive/second person syncretism.

4.4. Exclusive = second person

Syncretism between exclusive and second person are particularly prominent among Austronesian languages on and around the island Timor. In various languages of the Timor subgroup of Central Malayo-Polynesian, the subject prefix m- is used for exclusive as well as for second person singular and plural. This is found in Lamalera (Keraf 1978: 74–6), Dawanese (Steinhauer 1993: 133), Kisar (Blood 1992: 3), Sika (Lewis and Grimes 1995: 605) and Roti (Fox and Grimes 1995: 615). This syncretism is probably an accidental merger of the proto Central Malayo-Polynesian prefixes ma- for exclusive, mi- for second person plural and mu- for second person singular (Blust 1993: 258–9). These prefixes are, for example, still differentiated in Kola (Takata 1992: 54).

A syncretism between exclusive and second person plural is also found in various Western Oceanic (also Austronesian) languages. It is found in the subject prefix a- from Yabem (Ross 1995: 707), the subject prefix m- from Sobei (Stern 1987: 37), the object suffix -mi and the possessive clitic amia from Mekeo (Jones 1998: 150–1, 208–10, 230) and the inalienable possessive suffix -min from Central Buang (Hookey 1995: 734). Interestingly, there is also one Western Oceanic language in which
the syncretism between exclusive and second person is found in independent pronouns, namely in Nehan (Todd 1978: 1183–6). The pronoun for exclusive and for second person plural is *ingam*. This might seem a rather different construction as in the Austronesian languages mentioned so far. However, the first and second-person pronouns of Nehan appear to be constructed on the basis of a root *ing*-. The syncretism thus consists only of the suffix *-am*. This is probably the same merger as the other Austronesian syncretisms that have been discussed. In the Remote Oceanic language Buma, the subject prefixes show an exclusive/third person syncretism both in the dual (*-ba*) and in the plural (*-pi/pe*). The same syncretism is also attested in the Micronesian languages Ulithian and Trukese. In Ulithian, the subject pronoun *xa* can be used for reference to the exclusive as well as to the second person plural (Sohn and Bender 1973: 42, 101–5). In Trukese, the comparable syncretized subject pronoun is *jéwy* (Dyen 1965: 12). Following the tradition of Micronesian descriptions, these markers are called ‘(short) subject pronouns’, but they seem to be obligatorily present before each verb, so they are probably better not interpreted as independent pronouns, but as proclitics, or maybe even as prefixes.

Outside of the Austronesian stock, there are three examples of a syncretism between exclusive and second person. The first of these is found in the southern dialect of Udihe (called Bikin), a Tungusic language from Russia, in which the suffix *-u* marks for both person categories (Nikolaeva and Tolskaya 2001: 212). In an older survey of the Tungusic languages, Benzing (1955) does not find this syncretism in any Tungusic language. He differentiates for Udihe between a suffix *-u* for exclusive and a suffix *-hu* for second person plural (Benzing 1955: 1078). However, according to Nikolaeva and Tolskaya (2001: 51), there is no phonemic */h/ in southern Udihe. In northern Udihe, the original */h/* is conserved as a pharyngealisation of the following vowel, so in this variant there is still a difference between a plain *-u* for the exclusive and a pharyngealised *-u* for second person plural. In southern Udihe, the pharyngealised vowels have become long vowels, but vowel length is being lost, especially word-finally, leading to the syncretism of the exclusive and the second person plural (I. Nikolaeva, p.c.).

The final cases of an exclusive/second person syncretism are found among the non-Pama-Nyungan language from northern Australia. The first is attested in Burarra. The intransitive prefixes *nyirri-* (for dual) and *nyihurr-* (for plural) mark both for exclusive and second person (Glasgow 1984). In the closely related language Ndjébbana (McKay 2000: 240), the exclusive and second person are distinguished, but the difference consists only of an initial lamino-palatal nasal for the exclusive *(njirri-* for unit augmented and *njarra-* for augmented) versus an initial apical-alveolar nasal for the second person *(nirri-* for unit augmented and *narra-* for augmented). These two sounds appear to have merged in Burarra, leading to the present syncretism between exclusive and second person. The other example is Tiwi, which presently has no known close relative. The intransitive prefixes from Tiwi are identical for exclusive and second person plural: *ngmpi-* for non-past and *nginti-* for past (Osborne 1974: 38; Lee 1987: 173).
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4.5. Summary

As shown in Section 4.2, it is not very common, outside the Algonquian languages, for inclusives and second person to be identical. Among the fourteen cases presented, the best cases are Sanuma and Itonama, in which the syncretism is attested in the independent pronouns. There are a few examples, discussed in Section 4.3, which, on closer inspection, do not turn out to be examples of real syncretism between inclusive and second person. A central argument to disqualify apparent syncretism is the fact that the inclusive is a combination of first and second person markers.

The sixteen cases presented in Section 4.4 show that it not at all unheard of that there is a syncretism between exclusive and second person. Among these cases, there is even one language (Nehan) that shows this syncretism in its independent pronouns. All examples appear to be cases of relatively recent merger, because closely related languages do not have the same syncretism. Only in the Timor family, various (but far from all) closely related languages show the same syncreted person-marking structure. However, even if all examples are historical coincidences, this still leaves open the question why the semantically rather disparate categories ‘exclusive’ and ‘second person’ are not disambiguated. Apparently, there is no absolute need to do so.

Comparing the two collections, there appears to be no reason to consider the inclusive/second person syncretism to be more ‘regular’ than the exclusive/second person syncretism. For both syncretisms, almost all examples are inflectional, but incidental examples (Sanuma/Itonama and Nehan, respectively) show that it is also possible for independent pronouns to have either syncretism. Further, both syncretisms are generally found in isolated cases (meaning that close relatives do not have the same syncretism), except for one genetic group for either syncretisms in which the syncretism is widespread (Algonquian and Timor, respectively).

5. Clusivity and third person

5.1. Introduction

As shown in the previous section, it is possible for the inclusive and for the exclusive to be identical to the second person. The logical next question is whether it is also possible for the inclusive or exclusive to be identical to the third person. As will be shown in this section, it is indeed possible to have either an inclusive/third person syncretism (Section 5.2) or an exclusive/third person syncretism (Section 5.3). Further, the number of cases and the general structural characteristics will turn out to be much alike in both syncretisms. The empirical evidence for these two syncretisms will even turn out to be comparable to the syncretisms with second person as surveyed in the previous section. All four theoretical possibilities are roughly equally common and show a comparable world-wide distribution.
5.2. Inclusive = third person

A syncretism between inclusive and third person is consistently found in the subject prefixes of the Tanna languages from Vanuatu. Genetically, these languages belong to the Central-Eastern Oceanic branch of the Austronesian stock. The five Tanna languages — Kwamera, Lenakel, North Tanna, Southwest Tanna and Whitesands — all have a syncretism between the inclusive and the third person non-singular, using a prefix $k$- for both referential categories (Lynch 1967: 46–8; Lindstrom and Lynch 1994: 10–12; Lynch 1978: 45). The Tanna languages are a subgroup of the Southern Vanuatu family and for Proto-Southern Vanuatu, Lynch (1986: 274) reconstructs an opposition between an inclusive prefix $k(V)$- and a third person plural prefix $γ$-. This opposition is still attested in Ura, another language from the Southern Vanuatu family, where the inclusive prefix is $(g)ur$- and the prefix for third person plural $(γ)iri$- (Crowley 1998: 21). The syncretism in the Tanna languages is thus a relatively recent merger. However, this syncretism in the person inflection does not cause the independent pronouns to be used for disambiguation. For example, Lynch notes about Lenakel that there is a ‘homophony between $k$- ‘first inclusive’, and $k$- ‘third non-singular’; which of these is actually present is almost always determined by the context” (Lynch 1978: 45). The same merger is also attested in Atchin, a language from the North and Central Vanuatu family, showing that this merger is not a singularity of the Tanna languages. In Atchin, the suffix for inalienable pronominal possession is $-r$ for both the inclusive and the third person plural. The possessive pronouns that are used for alienable possession are derived from these suffixes and consequently show the same syncretism (Capell and Layard 1980: 55–6).

Still within Oceanic, this syncretism is found in Nalik, a Western Oceanic language from New Ireland and in Buma, a Remote Oceanic language from the Santa Cruz islands. In Buma, the subject prefixes show an inclusive/third person syncretism both in the dual ($-la$) and in the plural ($-li/le$). In Nalik, the prefixal subject marker $di(a)$- is used for both inclusive and third person plural (Volker 1998: 47–51). The speakers of Nalik are well aware of this syncretism, which is proven by the fact that the syncretism is taken over by some speakers into their variant of Tok Pisin, replacing the Tok Pisin inclusive independent pronoun $yumi$ by the Tok Pisin third person plural pronoun $ol$ (Volker 1998: 48). Another example of this syncretism is found in Muna, a Western Malayo-Polynesian language from Sulawesi (Indonesia), distantly related to the previous cases within the Austronesian stock. In Muna, the subject prefix $do$- is used for both inclusive and third person plural (van den Berg 1989: 53). The potential ambiguity does not result in an obligatorily used personal pronoun: “the personal pronouns are optionally used ... to emphasise the subject of a verbal predicate, in addition to the subject marker” (van den Berg 1989: 82). Roughly within the same area, yet genetically unrelated to the previous cases, this syncretism is also attested in Hatam, a West Papuan language from the Bird’s Head (Irian Jaya). Both the subject prefix $i(g)$- (Reesink 1999: 51) and the prefix
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1. (p) for inalienable possession (Reesink 1999: 48) are used for inclusive as well as for third person plural.

At the other side of the world, a syncretism between inclusive and third person is attested in the pronominal prefixes from Huave, a Huavean language from Mexico. There is massive allophony in these pronominal prefixes, but in all allophones the inclusive is identical to the third person. This indicates that the syncretism is not a random merger, though there is no comparative information to shed light on the history of this structure. The syncretism is obligatorily disambiguated by various suffixes that mark non-singular (Stairs and Hollenbach 1969: 48–53).

A special case is the extinct language Tupinambá, a Tupí language from Brazil. We only know about this language because two missionaries described it in the 16th and 17th century. From these descriptions, Rodrigues (1990) extracts the fact that the subject prefixes ya- and o- can be used both for inclusive and for third person reference, yet only in transitive clauses. No syncretism is found in intransitive clauses, ya- is consistently used for inclusive and o- for third person (Rodrigues 1990: 396). In this usage, the prefixes are identical to the reconstructed active prefixes from Proto-Tupí-Guaraní (Jensen 1990: 120). However, in transitive sentences in Tupinambá, both these prefixes can be used for inclusive as well as for third person. The precise interpretation of the transitive use of these prefixes remains somewhat mysterious, though Rodrigues argues that it is related to the marking of focus. No contemporary Tupí language has been described to show this syncretism, so the old Tupinambá grammars are the only source of information (see Section 7 for a summary of the analysis by Rodrigues). The independent pronouns from Tupinambá show exactly the same referential structure as the prefixes with the same syncretism between inclusive and third person (Rodrigues 1990: 396, 402).

Finally, mention has to be made of the Kiranti (Tibeto-Burman) language in this context. The dual in the Kiranti languages is marked using a suffix -ci (e.g. Athpare, Ebert 1997a: 23–38; Camling, Ebert 1997b: 16–24) or -ti (e.g. Dumi, van Driem 1993a: 95–9). The exclusive suffix is generally explicitly marked in contrast to the other persons (in Athpare with -ciŋa, in Camling with -cka and in Dumi with -ti). As a result, the inclusive dual suffix is identical to both the second and third person dual. The second person dual is disambiguated by root changes and a prefix (t)i- (except for Kulung, see Section 3.2). There remains a complete syncretism between the inclusive dual and the third person dual in Athpare, Camling and Dumi (see van Driem 1993b; 1997; 1990 for a comparative analysis of the Kiranti person markers).

5.3. Exclusive = third person

A syncretism between exclusive and third person is attested in the Cariban language Wai Wai. The pronominal prefix for both exclusive and third person is n(ti)-, as opposed to the prefix for inclusive, which is t(ti)- (Hawkins 1998: 178–9). The syncretism between exclusive and third person is regularly disambiguated by the use of an exclusive independent pronoun amna. Exactly the same structure is also found in
the closely related language Hixkaryana (Derbyshire 1979: 146–9). In a survey of the Cariban family, Derbyshire (1999) notes that a syncretism between exclusive and third person appears to be the rule in the Cariban family: “except for Makushi and Kuiküro, the [exclusive] prefix is identical in form and function with third person, and a free pronoun ana (or cognate) is always present [to mark exclusive reference, M.C.]” (Derbyshire 1999: 32). The languages that have an exclusive/third person syncretism in this survey by Derbyshire are Kariña (=Carib), Tiriyó (=Trio), Carijona, Kashuyana, Wai Wai, Hixkaryana, Waimiri-Athroari, Arekuna, Akawaio, Wayana, Dekwana, Bakairi and ‘Txikão. The exceptions to this Cariban idiosyncrasy, Makushi and Kuiküro, both have innovated specialised marking for the exclusive. These innovations have been independent developments because these languages are neither close relatives within Cariban nor spoken in each other’s neighbourhood and the innovative exclusive morphemes are not cognate. The language Pan are also does not have this syncretism because the inclusive–exclusive distinction has been lost in the prefixes (Gildea 1989; Derbyshire 1999: 32–3). The loss of clusivity has resulted in an even more extensive syncretism as the already syncreted exclusive/third person prefix has expanded its meaning to cover also inclusive reference. The same development has taken place in Kapöñ and Pemon (S. Gildea, p.c.). Besides the Carib languages, there are a few incidental cases that also show a syncretism between exclusive and third person. It is, for example, found in Shuswap, a Salish language from Canada. None of the other Salish languages has an opposition between inclusive and exclusive, and it is consequently not part of a reconstruction of the pronominal elements of Proto-Salish (Newman 1980: 156; Davis 2000). In Shuswap, however, the third person suffix -əs is also used for the exclusive; the inclusive is marked by -ət, the equivalent of the Proto-Salish first person plural suffix *-at. The syncretism between exclusive and third person can optionally be disambiguated by the morphologically independent element kwəx for the exclusive (Kuipers 1974: 45, 59). The origin of this construction is not yet conclusively resolved. van Eijk (this volume) argues that the existence of clusivity in Shuswap is the result of influence by neighbouring Algonquian languages. Van Eijk proposes that the independent element kwəx is related to the proto-Salish second person subject clitic *kəxə. This clitic has been reanalysed as a first person marker kəx in Kalispel and Okanagan. In Shuswap, the combination of this person marker with a third person inflected verb results in an exclusive reference. Another example of this syncretism in America is attested in Kiowa, a Tanoan language of Southwestern USA. In Kiowa, the exclusive agent prefix kə- is identical to the inverse third person marking (Watkins 1984: 113). In the closely related language Southern Tiwa, which does not mark clusivity, the first and third person non-singular are identical (in- for dual and i- for plural, Allen and Frantz 1978: 11). This correspondence is analysed by Watkins (1984: 127–8) as a sign of the historical relationship between the languages. Two other examples of this syncretism come from New Guinea, yet from opposite corners of this linguistically diverse island. First, it is attested in Binandere, a Goilalan language from southeastern New Guinea. There are many different
tense-aspect variants of the verbal person suffixes in this language, but in all these paradigms, the exclusive is identical to the third person plural. The large variety of paradigms showing this syncretism in this language indicates that it is not a recent merger but a structural property of the language (Capell 1969: 16–31; see also Section 3.2). Two closely related languages, Orokaiva (Healey et al. 1969: 62) and Korafe (Farr and Farr 1975: 747–9), both have a comparable syncretism between first person plural and third person plural but without a separate inclusive. Second, a syncretism between exclusive and third person singular is attested in Hatam, a West Papuan language from the Bird’s Head, the northwestern end of New Guinea. The inalienable possession prefix for both exclusive and third person singular reference is ni(p)-. The verbal subject prefixes are almost identical to these prefixes for inalienable possession, yet the third person singular on verbs is zero, so that the exclusive/third person syncretism is not found in the subject prefixes (Reesink 1999:48, 51).

Finally, I know of two cases with an exclusive/third person syncretism in Africa. In Diola-Fogny, an Atlantic (Niger-Congo) language from Senegal, verbs have prefixal bound pronouns (cf. Section 4.2 above). The short versions of these prefixes show a prefix a- that is used for both exclusive and third person singular. This recent merger is not disambiguated by any other linguistic material (Sapir 1965: 90–1). In Buduma, a Chadic (Afro-Asiatic) language from Chad/Nigeria, both the exclusive and the third person plural are marked with the prefix yə- and this syncretism is normally not disambiguated by the linguistic marking (Awagana 2001: 62–3). Such a syncretism is not found in any other Chadic language.

5.4. Summary

There are fifteen examples with a syncretism between the inclusive and the third person, as described in Section 5.2. Among these, there is one narrow genetic family in which all members have the same syncretism (the Tanna languages). In some of the fifteen languages, the syncretism is obligatorily disambiguated (in particular in Huave), but in most cases this does not seem to be the case. In Nalik, this syncretism appears to be a completely normal and accepted part of the linguistic awareness within the speech community. This can be concluded from the fact that the same syncretism is taken over into their dialect of Tok Pisin. In general, the syncretism between inclusive and third person is just as common and normal as the inclusive/second person syncretism that has been discussed in Section 4.2.

The set of syncretisms between exclusive and third person, as described in Section 5.3, has the same characteristics. There are slightly more examples with this syncretism (nineteen languages) due to its widespread occurrence in the Cariban family. In the Cariban languages, the syncretism is regularly disambiguated by use of an independent pronoun for the exclusive. However, the syncretism is not obligatorily disambiguated in the remaining four examples, which are found widely dispersed throughout the world’s languages. To summarise, there seems to be no typological reason to consider either the inclusive/third person or the exclusive/third person
syncretism to be more common than the other or more common than the previously discussed syncretisms inclusive/second person and exclusive/second person.

6. Mixes of inclusive and exclusive

6.1. Introduction

The final variants of syncretism involving clusivity to be discussed in this chapter are syncretisms between inclusive and exclusive reference. The most obvious kind of such a syncretism is a morphemes like the English pronoun *we*, which is used for all inclusive and all exclusive reference. Such syncretisms are common and will not further be considered here because there is simply no clusivity marked at all. In this section, cases will be considered in which there is clusivity marked in some sense, but the difference between the various morphemes involved do not follow along the standard division between inclusive and exclusive.\(^\text{11}\) The best way to approach these curious divisions is by starting from a minimal-augmented person marking system. In a minimal-augmented system, there are three different forms for *we*. First, there is the 'minimal inclusive', which is only used with reference to the speech-act dyad of speaker and one addressee — also called 'dual inclusive'. Second, there is the 'augmented inclusive', which is used for all other inclusive reference. This 'plural inclusive' is used with reference to three or more participants, including at least the speaker and the addressee. The third form for *we* in a minimal-augmented system is the exclusive. Such a division is well-attested world-wide (Cysouw 2003: 139–40). On the basis of this tripartite division, two different kinds of syncretism can be characterised. On the one hand, there are languages in which the minimal-inclusive/exclusive is combined with the exclusive into the referential value of one morpheme; a different morpheme marks for the augmented inclusive only (Section 6.2). On the other hand, there are cases in which the augmented inclusive is combined with exclusive, in contrast to a separately marked minimal inclusive (Section 6.3).

6.2. Minimal inclusive = exclusive

The best described case of a syncretism between minimal inclusive and exclusive is attested in Gooniyandi, a non-Pama-Nyungan language from northwestern Australia. The minimal-inclusive/exclusive pronoun is *ngidi* and the augmented inclusive pronoun is *yaddi* (McGregor 1989; 1990: 167–73). McGregor uses the terms ‘restricted’ and ‘unrestricted’, respectively, to refer to these crosslinguistically unusual combinations of referential values. Exactly the same distinction if attested in the closely related language Bunaba (Rumsey 2000: 70–2). In Bunaba, the minimal-inclusive/exclusive combination is expressed by the pronoun *ngiyirri*. The two different meanings of this pronoun are optionally disambiguated by a dual suffix -way or a plural suffix -yani. The pronoun for augmented inclusive in Bunaba is *yaarri*. 
In both Gooniyandi and Bunaba, the verbal inflection shows the same syncretism (Rumsey 2000: 80–8; McGregor 1990).

The Gooniyandi-type syncretism is rare cross-linguistically, yet it is not completely unheard of. Another example of this syncretism is found in Yaouré, a Mande language from Ivory Coast. There are two different forms for the first person plural with a division of meaning that is alike to the one in Gooniyandi: ‘kàà, which has an inclusive reference (the speaker and a group of listeners) and kò, which has either a dual reference (you and I) or an exclusive reference (the others and I)” (Hopkins 1986: 192). The pronoun kàà is the odd one out, as its morphophonological behaviour is different from all other pronouns. Probably, this pronoun is a recent addition to the pronominal paradigm. The syncretism as found in Yaouré is a singularity among the Mande languages — no other case is presently known in this family (V. Vydrine, p.c.). However, there are some other Mande languages that have a (non-syncreted) minimal-augmented paradigm, viz. Dan (Doneux 1968: 45–7) and Northern Looma (V. Vydrine, p.c.; cf. Greenberg 1988: 2, citing Prost 1967).

Also in Africa, though completely unrelated to the Mande languages, this same structure is found in two neighbouring, but unrelated, languages in southern Chad. The occurrence of this unusual structure in these two languages makes a good argument for areal influence. Both Tumak (a Chadic language, belonging to the Afro-Asiatic stock) and Sar (a Sara-Bagirmi language, belonging to the Nilo-Saharan stock) have two different pronouns to be translated in to English as we. In Tumak, the pronoun mà is glossed as ‘nous (duel ou exclusif)’ and the pronoun dì is glossed as ‘nous (inclusif)’ (Caprile 1975: 31). The first pronoun is used for all dual reference and all exclusive reference, which boils down to the same thing that has been called minimal-inclusive/exclusive syncretism here. The second pronoun is probably only used for inclusives with more than three persons (although the source is not explicit in this point). In Sar, the pronoun jì is glossed as inclusive and the pronoun jì is as exclusive, though it is added that all dual reference is done with the exclusive pronoun (Palayer 1989: 202). The distinction between the two forms is made even more explicit in the discussion of the verbal inflection, where it is said that the prefix j- is used for the dual inclusive and all exclusive reference, and the circumfix j-...i is used for the inclusive plural, there being three or more referents (Palayer 1989: 208).

Finally, the same minimal-inclusive/exclusive syncretism is also found in the independent pronouns from Kunimaipa, a Goilalan language from the southeastern tip of Papua New Guinea. In this language, there are two different forms for ‘we’. The pronoun rei is used for the combination minimal inclusive and exclusive. The pronoun rari is used for the augmented inclusive (Pence 1968; Geary 1977: 17–18). There is an optional suffix -pi, a dual/trial marker. The combination rari-pi is an inclusive trial. However, this number suffix cannot be used for disambiguation of the different meanings of the pronoun rei as the pronoun rei-pi has only dual reference (both minimal inclusive and exclusive dual, Geary 1977: 17). This bivalent dual/trial usage of the suffix -pi indicates that there is a relation to a so-called unit-augmented paradigm, with the suffix -pi marking unit-augmented (cf. McKay 1978). This is
confirmed by the closely related language Weri, which has a unit-augmented type paradigm with a suffix -ip marking unit-augmented (Boxwell 1967: 36). The particular syncretism of Kunimaipa is probably the result of a merger of an erstwhile minimal-augmented paradigm.

6.3. Augmented inclusive = exclusive

Greenberg (1988: 9) was the first to explicitly note the possibility of a contrast between minimal inclusive (‘I and you’) on the one hand and a syncretism of augmented inclusive (‘I, you and other’) and exclusive (‘I and others’) on the other hand. He called this structure the Assiniboine-type after the Siouan language in which he observed this phenomenon. In Assiniboine, the syncretism is produced by the special usage of the plural suffix -pi. The pronominal prefix u-k- is used for all first person plural reference. The plural suffix -pi is normally used together with u-k-, except in case of minimal inclusive reference (Levin 1964: 31–2). The independent pronouns of Assiniboine are made from the same affixes and show the same structure (Greenberg 1989: 457). The situation is identical in the closely related Siouan language Lakota. Both the verbal inflection (Rood and Taylor 1996: 465) as well as the independent pronouns (Van Valin 1977: 74–5; cf. Rood and Taylor 1996: 454) show this particular syncretism. Also the prefixes from Ioway/Oto show the same structure (Whitman 1947: 242). The main point of doubt remains about the obligatoryness and reference of the crucial number suffix -pi. For example, Rood (1996: 469) notes that the suffix -pi in Lakota is used with object reference in transitive constructions. If this suffix is not obligatorily coreferential with the person prefixes (and the sources are not very explicit in this respect), then these examples are not prime cases of an augmented inclusive/exclusive syncretism.

Even if the Siouan cases would be disqualified, there are still some other examples of this syncretism attested in the world’s languages. The clearest cases are found among the non-Pama-Nyungan languages in northwestern Australia. I know of examples in Tiwi (Tiwian), Burarra (Burarran) and in various Nyulnyulan languages. In Tiwi, the independent pronoun muwa is used for minimal inclusive and the pronoun nga is used for the combination augmented inclusive/exclusive (Lee 1987: 101). In the description of Tiwi by Osborne (1974: 54), a pronoun nga tua is observed for augmented inclusive. The difference between the two descriptions might be accounted for by dialectal differences or it could be the result of recent changes. In young people’s speech (as described by Lee 1987), the loss of the marking of clusivity has progressed even further. The minimal inclusive muwa has been lost as well, which results in a complete loss of any marking of clusivity in the independent pronouns (Lee 1987: 101–3). In Burarra, the minimal inclusive pronoun is ngarripa. The referential structure of the combined augmented inclusive/exclusive pronoun is somewhat complicated by the existence of a unit-augmented series in the paradigm (cf. McKay 1978). The combination unit-augmented-inclusive/exclusive-dual is marked by the pronoun nga-tippa and the combination augmented-in-
clusivity/exclusive-plural is marked by the pronoun nga-yburrrpa (Glasgow 1964: 110–11; 1984: 15). This syncretism in Burarra is disambiguated by the use of person prefixes. However, these prefixes have a syncretism between exclusive and second person (see Section 4.4 above). Comparison with the closely related language Ndjebbana (McKay 2000: 171, 203) shows that this syncretism probably arose relatively recently by a merger of a lamino-palatal and a dorso-velar nasal.

Other cases of this syncretism in Australia are attested in the Nyulnyulan languages. The clearest case is the subject prefixes from Bardi. In Bardi, the minimal inclusive prefix is a- and the prefix for the combination augmented-inclusive/exclusive is ay- (Metcalfe 1975: 123). This syncretism can optionally be disambiguated by the use of independent pronouns, which show a complete minimal-augmented paradigm (Metcalfe 1975: 49–50, 203). This particular syncretism is indirectly attested in the language Nyulnyul, in which the marking is structurally identical to the examples of the Siouan languages as discussed above. In Nyulnyul, the pronominal prefixes themselves do not show the syncretism — the prefix ya- simply marks for all first person plural reference (McGregor 1996: 40–1). But McGregor notes that the plural marking can be left out for minimal inclusive reference: "[ya-] occasionally occurs without the number marking prefix [-rr-] when it refers to the speaker-hearer dyad: that is, when reference is made to the 1&2 minimal category" (McGregor 1996: 40). However, judging from the example shown in (2), it is not obligatory for plural marking to be left out with minimal inclusive reference. This syncretism is not attested in yet another Nyulnyulan language, Warrwa. In this language, there is a regular difference between an inclusive yu- and an exclusive nga/ka- prefix (McGregor 1994: 41, see also Section 3.2).

(2) Nyulnyul (McGregor 1996: 42)
ngay a juy ya-lr-rid jid derby-ung
1SG.PRON CONJ 2SG.PRON 1PL-IRR-PL-GO PLACE-ALL
"You and I might go to Derby."

Further, there are two cases of this syncretism in New Guinea. One example is attested in Kunimaipa, a Goilalan language from Southeastern Papua New Guinea. In the imperfect, a suffix -paine marks for minimal inclusive and a suffix -ka marks for the combination augmented inclusive/exclusive. The same syncretism is also attested in the perfect suffixes, yet here the referential values of the suffixes are even more messed up (Pence 1968: 110; Geary 1977: 26). The other example is found in the independent pronouns of Hatam, a West Papuan language from the Bird’s Head (the westernmost part of New Guinea). There are two pronouns to be translated into English as we in Hatam. In Reesink (1999: 40–1), the pronoun sa(ni) is simply glossed as ‘dual’ without further specification, but in Reesink (2002: 3) it is explicitly noted that this pronoun is only used for dual inclusive. The remaining combination of augmented inclusive and exclusive is marked by the pronoun nye(ni).

The final examples of this kind of syncretism come from America. In Guató, a Macro-Gé language from Brazil, the pronominal inflection is a mix of pre-
suffixes. Clusivity is marked by two prefixes, the prefix *ga-* for minimal inclusive and the prefix *dya-* for the remaining combination of augmented inclusive and exclusive reference. The independent pronouns consist of the same person markers affixed to a root -ol(ò)- and show the same syncretism (Palácio 1986: 366–70). This structure of Guató appears to be a singularity within the Macro-Ge languages (Rodrigues 1999: 186–7). Finally, in Pech, a Chibchan language from Honduras, the pronoun *patás* is glossed as “dual” and the pronoun *untás* as “plural” (Holt 1999: 40). However, in the discussion of the verbal inflection, it is made explicit that the gloss “dual” is only a shorthand for “first-person-dual-[inclusive]”, which means that the other pronoun probably has a combined augmented inclusive/exclusive reference (Holt 1999: 49).

6.4. Summary

There are six languages presently known to me of the peculiar syncretism, which combines the reference of minimal inclusive (‘you and I’) with the reference of exclusive into the marking of one morpheme. The other structure, combining augmented inclusive with exclusive, is likewise uncommon — eleven examples are attested. However, both sets of languages are geographically and genetically diverse, which warrants the conclusion that both syncretisms are real possibilities of human language, albeit rare ones.

In contrast to the syncretism between clusivity and second/third person, there are many examples of independent pronouns among the presented mixes of inclusive and exclusive reference. Five out of six languages with the minimal-inclusive/exclusive mix have this syncretism in their independent pronouns. The other syncretism is attested in independent pronouns in seven out of eleven languages.

7. Analysis of the syncretisms attested

In total, 122 cases of a syncretism involving clusivity have been discussed in this chapter, as summarised in Table 1 (see the appendix for a complete listing). However, many of these languages have been mentioned twice (viz. the Algonquian languages, the Tanna languages, Huave, Binandere, Kiowa, Diola-Fony, Burarra, Buma, and Kunimaipa), one language has been mentioned three times (Hatam) and one language has even been mentioned four times (Tiwi). Subtracting these, there are ninety-nine different languages that have (at least) one of the syncretisms discussed. Relative to the 6,703 languages as mentioned in the thirteenth edition of the Ethnologue (Grimes 1996: 955), this amounts to 1.5% of the world’s languages. I expect there to be more cases among the Austronesian languages and among the non-Austronesian languages of New Guinea. Also in the Tibeto-Burman family and among the native languages of Mesoamerica I expect more languages with syncretisms to exist than have been summarised here. My informed guess is that the kind of syn-
Syncretisms involving clusivity

Syncretisms that were discussed in this chapter are to be found in about 2 to 3 percent of the world’s languages. This low proportion indicates that the phenomenon reviewed in this chapter is typologically rare among the world’s languages. Still, 2 to 3 percent of the world’s languages represent a high number of cases. This indicates that it is not at all impossible for a human language to have any of these syncretisms reviewed. Even stronger, given that only about 40% of the world’s languages have some kind of clusivity (cf. Nichols & Bickel, this volume; Siewierska & Bakker, this volume), the present ninety-nine cases are 3.7% of all languages with some kind of clusivity. Incorporating a factor two for all yet unknown or undescribed cases, this amounts to about 7% of the languages with some kind of clusivity. Such proportions are at least worth the establishment of a sub-class.

There is a clear asymmetry between the inclusive/first person and the exclusive/first person syncretism. The inclusive/first person syncretism only occurs in one incidental case. In contrast, the exclusive/first person syncretism is relatively widespread. It is attested in fourty languages belonging to twenty-one different linguistic families. This indicates that the exclusive can be seen as a kind of first person, but the inclusive cannot. The exclusive/first person syncretism is even attested in the independent pronouns of fifteen languages. I assume that speakers of a language are much more consciously aware of their independent pronouns than of their inflectional person marking. Under this assumption, the ubiquity of exclusive/first person syncretisms among independent pronouns emphasizes the conclusion that the exclusive is a kind of first person (cf. Daniel, this volume).

The occurrences of the next four syncretisms (inclusive/second person, exclusive/second person, inclusive/third person and exclusive/third person) are strikingly similar. Each of these syncretisms is attested in about fifteen languages belonging to about eight families. They occur thus clearly less often than the exclusive/first person syncretism. Still, all four syncretisms occur in various cases, well dispersed throughout the world’s languages. For each syncretism, there is also at

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of families</th>
<th>No. of languages</th>
<th>Independent pronouns</th>
<th>Inflectional marking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive = first person</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal inclusive = exclusive</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmented inclusive = exclusive</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>122</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Multiple occurrences subtracted)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(99)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(91)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
least one group of genetically related languages in which the syncretism is widespread, which indicates that all four syncretisms are not necessarily diachronically instable. Finally, almost all examples are found in inflectional paradigms — the examples among independent pronouns are incidental cases. The important conclusion that can be drawn from these occurrences is that the semantically transparent combinations (inclusive/second person and exclusive/third person) are not different from the semantically opaque combinations (inclusive/third person and exclusive/second person).

The last two syncretisms discussed show an unusual combination of characteristics. They are both really rare, just a few examples belonging to a few families are attested, yet these few examples are found in all corners of the world. The reasons for both these syncretisms are thus more than incidental. The fact that both syncretisms are rather often attested among independent pronouns stresses the fact that these syncretisms are a real possibility of linguistic structure, albeit rare ones. In the next section I will discuss the various explanations that have been brought forward for the existence of these syncretisms.

8. Explaining the anomalies

The question now remains why the uncommon syncretisms exist. As I have shown, various kinds of syncretisms involving clusivity are uncommon, yet they exist in more than one case (so it is not enough to invoke coincidence to explain the existence) in various geographically dispersed part of the world (so one cannot resort to contact for an explanation). To explain the existence of the various syncretisms, it is possible to use a diachronic or a synchronic perspective.

From a diachronic perspective, an explanation amounts to clarifying how a syncretism arose. Among the syncretisms reviewed in this chapter, by far the most originated by an accidental merger (when diachronic or comparative data is available at all). Only a few examples give some indication of other possible source of a syncretism. For Caddo, Chafe (1990) argues that the inclusive was originally a defocusing marker. As this marker was reanalysed as an inclusive, the formerly first person marker (used for both singular and plural) was reduced to only the first person singular and the exclusive usage. The development resulted is an exclusive/first person syncretism. For the Mixtecan languages, I argued (see Section 3.2) that the formerly exclusive pronoun was reanalysed as a first person humble marker. The first person singular extended its meaning to include exclusive reference, leading to an exclusive/first person syncretism. For Carib, Meira (2002: 257) and S. Gildea (p.c.) propose that the first person plural pronoun was originally a noun, which had third person agreement on verbs. As this noun grammaticalised to become an exclusive pronoun, it retained the third person agreement. This results in an exclusive/third person syncretism in the Carib verbal inflection. However, this proposal for the origin of the exclusive/third person syncretism in Carib is not based on any compar-
ative evidence. It is a speculation about a possible structure in Pre-Proto-Carib to explain the current syncreted structure. Finally, one could speculate that a part of an erstwhile transparent combination loses its person-marking status. For example, there are various examples of a first and a second person marker forming an inclusive (see Section 4.3). If the first person marker would lose its person-marking value, an inclusive/second person syncretism remains. Such a history might be fruitful to explain the origin of the Algonquian inclusive/second person syncretism.

Irrespective of origin, it is also an interesting question what a particular syncretism synchronically means for the speaker of a language. The common occurrence of the exclusive/first person syncretism can readily be explained semantically. An exclusive can be analysed as an associative plural, in which the first person is the focal referent. The others, which are included in the reference of the exclusive are non-focal participants in the speech act. It is semantically possible — and empirically widespread — for a language to reduce the marking of the exclusive to its focal referent only, i.e. the first person singular. In the same vein, it is tempting to propose semantic reasons for the transparent inclusive/second person and exclusive/third person syncretisms. However, the empirical status of these syncretisms is much more doubtful compared to the exclusive/first person syncretism. As set out above, there are clearly less cases and there are almost no examples of independent pronouns showing these syncretism. However, the main reason to object to a semantic analysis of these combinations is that the non-transparent syncretisms (inclusive/third person and exclusive/second person) are just as frequent as the semantically transparent ones.

Rodrigues (1990) searched for an explanation of the inclusive/third person syncretism, which he described for Tupinambá. He analysed the correspondence between inclusive and third using the notion ‘no contrast between speaker and hearer’. Both the inclusive as well as the third person treat speaker and addressee alike, by either including both (inclusive) or excluding both (third person). In combination with a notion of focus, Rodrigues claims to be able to explain the syncretism attested in Tupinambá:

The verbal person marker o- means that the third person is in focus and that there is no contrast between the speaker and the hearer; that is to say, it means {{you, I, and he} \textsuperscript{+f}} as well as {he \textsuperscript{+f}}. Analogously, ya- means that the third person is out of focus and that there is no contrast between the speaker and the hearer; it means {{you and I} \textsuperscript{+f} and he \textsuperscript{-f}}. (Rodrigues 1990: 402)

Although this reasoning is interesting, it is questionable whether such a general semantic explanation is the right approach. If this explanation makes sense for human language, then why is this syncretism not attested much more commonly among the world’s languages? The same problem occurs with the explanation put forward for the special syncretism of Gooniyandi (see Section 6.2) by McGregor (1996).\textsuperscript{14} He proposes that the particular difference between yaadi and ngidi can be explained as a special kind of inclusive/exclusive opposition, with the difference
that the inclusive (yaadi) has to include more than one addressee and the exclusive (ngidi) only excludes groups of more than one addressee, but still includes reference to one addressee:

Thus the system can be regarded as an inclusive/exclusive one. What is different from the traditional or classical inclusive/exclusive system lies in the nature to the thing that is included or excluded: in the traditional system it is the hearer or addressee; in the Bunaban system it is the hearers, an augmented group of addressees. In the traditional inclusive/exclusive system you-singular is the 'pivot'; in the Bunaban system it is you-non-singular, or you-augmented. (McGregor 1996: 166)

Again my criticism: if it is indeed possible for human language to invoke the cross-linguistically widespread semantic category of ‘you-non-singular’ to define the inclusive/exclusive opposition, then why is this not more regularly attested among the world’s languages?

To conclude, explanations should always have the right level of generalisation. Typological research is indispensable for determining the level of explanation, which is needed to explain a particular phenomenon in a particular language. If the phenomenon is rare cross-linguistically, then the explanation should not invoke universal characteristics, but use idiosyncratic reasons from the cultural or linguistic history of the language and its speakers. Only if a phenomenon is common cross-linguistically, general semantic, functional or structural explanations make sense.

Acknowledgements

The basic work on this chapter has been conducted while I was at the Zentrum für allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (ZAS) in Berlin. Further, I am very grateful to Hein Steinhauer, who first directed my attention to the strange syncretism in Kisar. This example urged me to look further, ultimately resulting in the present collection. Misha Daniel read earlier versions of this chapter with great care, as I did with his chapter in this volume. We discussed our differences of opinion extensively, with the result that not much of them remained. Further, I thank (in alphabetical order) George van Driem, Jan van Eijk, Aone van Engelenhoven, Elena Filimonova, Spike Gildea, Tom Güldemann, Sérgio Meira, Edith Moravcsik, Irina Nikolaeva, Richard Rhodes, and Valentin Vydrine for help with the many details of the present chapter. Notwithstanding their important input, the present content remains completely my own responsibility.

Notes

1. It remains unclear from the description by Lipkind (1945) whether the Winnebago inclusive prefix is only used for the minimal inclusive or also for the augmented inclusive (cf. Section 6.3 for other Siouan languages that make this difference). Greenberg (1988: 4–5, citing Susman 1943) claims indeed that the inclusive prefix can be used for both kinds of inclusive.
2. Veerman-Leichsenring (2000) does not use the term ‘inclusive’. She probably decided to use the term ‘collective’ instead, because this ‘inclusive’ is not a first person plural in Chocho, but a separate category of person (p. 322). This is completely in concord with my argumentation. However, I hold on to the term ‘inclusive’ and add that an inclusive is not normally a kind of first person plural.

3. Note that ‘the forms [with inclusive inflection] are similar to those of the third person masculine dual . . . but differ from them in many cases by always having an accent on the a of the actor morpheme’ (Anceaux 1965: 85–6).

4. From the survey by Voorhoeve (1975: 438–9) of the South Bird’s Head family (part of the purported Trans New-Guinea stock), it appears as if the language Puragi has an independent pronoun ididi that is used both for inclusive and for second person plural. However, this appears to be an error. In the original source (Cowan 1953: 22), the second person plural is the same as in Voorhoeve’s survey (though written idjidji), but the inclusive turns out to be nidjidji. Probably, the missing initial nasal is a printing error in Voorhoeve’s article.

5. The occurrence of the short version of the prefixes in Diola-Fogny is analysed as follows: ‘The full form is used . . . when the verb is neither contingent nor negative, and when it does not take a second position prefix or the verbal proclitic connectives man and ban. In all other situations the stripped form is used. . . . The stripped form may substitute for the full form depending on the context. This transformation indicates an imperative, an interrogative or the fact that emphasis is placed on the subject’ (Sapir 1965: 90–1).

6. Khoekhoe is the new name that the speakers themselves chose instead of the former double name Nama/Damara. Rather confusingly, the name Khoekhoe is used for the language and Khoe for its linguistic family, formerly called Central Khoisan.

7. The syncretism between exclusive and third person is so ubiquitous among the Cariban languages that it is sometimes taken for granted by the specialist in the field. Some descriptions do not, or only covertly, note the syncretism. It is not noted at all, for example, by Gildea (1998), nor in a paper on Tiriyo by Meira (2000a: 202–4), though in another paper (Meira 2000b: 62), he confirms that there is an exclusive/third person syncretism in Tiriyo. In a paper on the reconstruction of the proto-Carib independent pronouns, the syncreted inflection is mentioned in a footnote (Meira 2002: 257, n. 3). In the description of the language Carib (=Kariña) by Hoff, the existence of the syncretism is also hidden away in a footnote (Hoff 1968: 164, n. 44).

8. Derbyshire (1999) also includes Apalai in his list of Cariban languages with an exclusive/third person syncretism. However, the description by Koehn and Koehn (1986: 108) mentions two different forms, viz. exclusive ynan(y)– and third person n(y)–.

9. The labialisation, as indicated by the superscript w is written as a superscript circle in the original source on Shuswap by Kuipers (1974).

10. If the Shuswap pronoun kʷaxʷ can be analysed as being originally a first person marking, then the exclusive reference in Shuswap is marked by a semantically transparent combination of first and third person reference. This would then not count as an exclusive/third syncretism, just like transparent inclusives (made from a combination of first and second person markers) were dismissed in Section 4.3.

11. There are a few cases in which clusivity is marked in a restricted part of the person-marking paradigm only. These will not be considered here as examples of syncretism. Clusivity in the plural, but not in the dual is found in the independent pronouns from Gugu-Yalanji.
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(Pama-Nyungan, Australia, Oates and Oates 1964: 7), Jiarong (Tibeto-Burman, China, Baurman 1975: 131–2, 276), Tuaripi (Eleman, Papua New Guinea, Wurm 1975: 515), Guhu-Samanene (Binanderean, Papua New Guinea, Richard 1975: 781) and Korafe (Binanderean, Papua New Guinea, Farr and Farr 1975: 734–5). There are also a few cases in which clusivity is marked in the dual, but not in the plural. This is found in the independent pronouns from Samo (Central and South New Guinea, Papua New Guinea, Voorhoeve 1975: 391–2) and in the pronominal prefixes from the extinct language Coos (Coast Oregon, USA, Frachtenberg 1922: 321).

12. Greenberg (1989), after discussing the case of Bardi, also notes the same structure in a language called "Dampier land" (citing Cappell 1956: 87). This appears to be the same language as Bardi.

13. In fact, there is an error in the source here, as it literally says "the first-person-dual-exclusive morpheme . . . indicates 'you and I (but not they)'". (Holt 1999: 49). The second part of the sentence makes it clear that the word 'exclusive' should be read 'inclusive'.

14. This explanation for Gooniyandi is proposed by McGregor to replace his earlier attempts at an explanation (McGregor 1989; 1990).

Appendix

Survey of the examples with a syncretism involving clusivity as discussed in this chapter.

Within the various kind of syncretisms, the languages are grouped by genetic family relationship. Different families that belong to the same overarching genetic unit are counted separately when there does not appear to be a shared origin of the syncretism (e.g. various branches of Austronesian are counted separately because the syncretisms are probably independent developments in these branches). Some languages have the same syncretism both in their independent pronouns and in their inflectional marking (e.g. Asheninca Campa). Such languages are only counted once. In contrast, some languages have different kinds of syncretism in their person marking (i.e. they appear in different sections, e.g. Tiwi or Hatam). Such languages are counted more than once.

Inclusive = First person (Section 3.2): Found in 1 family (1 language)
Independent: -
Inflectional: Binandere (Central & Southeastern, Trans New Guinea)

Exclusive = First person (Section 3.3): Found in 21 families (40 languages)
Independent: Chalcatongo Mixtec, Ocotepec Mixtec, Yosodúa Mixtec, Diauxi-Tilantongo Mixtec (all Mixtecan, Oto-Manguean); Chocho (Popolocan, Otto-Manguean); Aymara, Jaru (Aymaran); Canela-Kraho (Gê); Asheninca, Nomatsiguenga, Caquinte (all Campa, Arawakan); Nimboran (Nimboran, Trans-New Guinea); Imonda, Amanab (both Border, Trans-New Guinea); Chrau (Mon-Khmer, Austro-Asiatic).
Inflectional: Winnebago (Siouan); Wichita, Caddo, Pawnee (all Caddoan); Menomini, Cree, Fox, Eastern Ojibwe, Southwestern Ojibwe, Passamaquoddy-Maliseet (all Algonquian); Huave (Huavean); Sierra Popoluca (Mixe-Zoque); Maká (Mataco-Guaicuruan); Ayamaru, Jaru (Aymaran); Uru, Chipaya (Uru-Chipayan); Canela-Kraho (Gê); Tarma Quechua (Quechuan); Asheninca, Nomatsiguenga, Caquinte (all Campa, Arawakan); Nimboran (Nimboran, Trans-New Guinea); Kwamera, Lenakel, North Tanna, Southwest Tanna,
Whitesands (all Tanna, Austronesian); Tiwi (Tiwian); Warrwa (Nyulnyulan); Svan (South Caucasian); Ngiti (Central Sudanic, Nilo-Saharan).

**Inclusive = Second person (Section 4.2):** Found in 9 families (14 languages)
Independent: Sanuma (Isolate), Itonama (Isolate)
Inflectional: Menomini, Cree, Fox, Eastern Ojibwe, Southwestern Ojibwe, Passamaquoddy-Maliseet (all Algonquian), Kiowa (Tanoan), Lavukaleve (East Papuan), Tiwi (Tiwian), Acelnese (Sundic, Austronesian), Diola-Fogny (Atlantic, Niger-Congo), Kulung (Kiranti), Itonama (Isolate).

**Exclusive = Second person (Section 4.4):** Found in 7 families (15 languages)
Independent: Nehan (Western Oceanic, Austronesian)
Inflectional: Lamalera, Dawanese, Kisar, Sika, Roti (all Timor, Austronesian), Yabem, Sobce, Mekeo, Central Buang (all Western Oceanic, Austronesian), Buna (Remote Oceanic, Austronesian), Ulithian, Trukese (both Micronesia, Austronesian), Southern Udihe (Tungusic), Burarra (Burarran), Tiwi (Tiwian).

**Inclusive = Third person (Section 5.2):** Found in 8 families (15 languages)
Independent: Tupinambá (Tupí)
Inflectional: Kwamera, Lenakel, North Tanna, Southwest Tanna, Whitesands (all Tanna, Austronesian), Atchin, Buma (Remote Oceanic, Austronesian), Nalik (Western Oceanic, Austronesian), Muna (Sulawesi, Austronesian), Hatam (West Papuan), Athpare, Camling, Dumi (all Kiranti, Tibeto-Burman), Huave (Huavean), Tupinambá (Tupí).

**Exclusive = Third person (Section 5.3):** Found in 7 families (19 languages)
Independent: -
Inflectional: Kariña, Tiriyó, Carijona, Kashuyana, Wai Wai, Hixkaryana, Waimiri-Atroari, Aretuna, Akawaio, Wayana, Dekwana, Bakairi, Tiwikó (all Carib), Kiowa (Tanoan), Shuswap (Salish), Binandere (Goilalan), Hatam (West Papuan), Diola-Fogny (Atlantic, Niger-Congo), Buduma (Chadic, Afro-Asiatic).

**Minimal inclusive = Exclusive (Section 6.2):** Found in 6 families (6 languages)
Independent: Bunaba, Gooniyandi (both Bunaban), Yaouré (Mande), Sara (Sara-Bagirmi, Nilo-Saharan), Kunimaipa (Goilalan, Trans-New Guinea).
Inflectional: Bunaba, Gooniyandi (both Bunaban), Sar (Sara-Bagirmi, Nilo-Saharan), Tumak (Chadic, Afro-Asiatic).

**Augmented inclusive = Exclusive (Section 6.3):** Found in 8 families (11 languages)
Independent: Assiniboine, Lakota (both Siouan), Hatam (West Papuan), Burarra (Burarran), Tiwi (Tiwian), Pech (Chibchan), Guató (Macro-Gé).
Inflectional: Assiniboine, Lakota, Iowa (all Siouan), Bardi, Nyulnyul (both Nyulnyulan), Hatam (West Papuan), Kunimaipa (Central & Southeast, Trans-New Guinea), Pech (Chibchan), Guató (Macro-Gé).
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